The Right to Judicial Review of Deportation Orders Under the Administrative Procedure Act by unknown
THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DEPORTATION
ORDERS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT*
ALIENS are currently being expelled from the United States at a rate of more
than 720,000 per year.' Although the vast majority of these leave under voltin-
tary procedures, 2 the forcible expulsion of other thousands 3 is made to depend
upon delicate factual findings by Immigration officials 4 that the alien is in one of
*Heikkila v. Barber, 73 Sup. Ct. 603 (1953).
1. In the year ended June 30, 1952, a total of 723,959 aliens were deported or de-
parted voluntarily from the United States. IMm. & NAT. SaRv. ANN. RtP, table 24A
(1952).
2. Under the immigration laws in effect prior to the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq. (Supp. 1953), the Attorney
General had authority to permit certain deportable aliens being proceeded against to depart
voluntarily from the United States to any country of their choice, in lieu of formal deporta-
tion. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155(c) (1) (Supp. 1952). The number
of aliens departing voluntarily "under proceedings" in the year ended June 30, 1952,
was 703,778. Imm. & NAT. SEav. REP. table 24A (1952). The large number of aliens
expelled and the commensurately large number of voluntary departures is to a consider-
able extent a result of the great number of Mexican illegal entrants coming into tie
United States. Id. at 34, 35. For the regulations governing voluntary departure prior
to the Act of 1952, see 8 CoDE FED. REGs. §§ 150.11, 1S0.11a, 150.11b (1949), and 8
CODE FED. RGs §§ 150.3, 152.1 (Supp. 1951). See also the discussion of the methods
employed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to carry out the policy of volun-
tary departures. Imm. & NAT.,SEyV. ANN. RE'. 37 (1952). For a discussion of voluntary
departure provisions of the Act of 1952, see Recent Developments in the Law--lnigratilon
& Naturalization, 66 HIA{v. L. REv. 643, 688-9 (1953).
3. In the year ended June 30, 1952, 20,181 aliens were formally deported. IM. &
NAT. SEv. ANN. REP. table 24A (1952).
4. The immigration laws prior to the passage of the Act of 1952 provided simply that
a deportable alien "shall upon the warrant of the Attorney General be taken into custody
and deported." 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1946). The pro-
cedures involved in deportation were prescribed by administrative regulations within
bounds set by judicial requirements of due process. The rules regulating these procedures
are set forth in 8 CoDE FED. Rims. §§ 150, 151 (Supp. 1951). For a resum6 of the pro-
cedures before 1952, see Werner, Expulsion of Aliens From the United States, 9 Imm. &
NAT. SERv. MONTHLY Rv. 114 (1951); and for an exposition of the rules under the
Act of 1952 with references to former procedures, see Developments in the LawA---hand-
gration and Nationality, 66 H~Av. L. REv. 643, 690-7 (1953).
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the deportable categories defined by Congress in the immigration laws.E Court
review of these findings is sought annually by hundreds of designated deportees.
Prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946,7 there
were two methods by which aliens could question the validity of deportation
proceedings in the courts. Where the deportee contested his status as an
alien, or claimed eligibility for citizenship, the courts permitted him to seek
judicial examination of his classification in an action for declaratory judg-
ment.8 But where citizenship was not in issue, the alien could obtain review
5. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155 (Supp. 1952); 40 STA'T. 1012
(1918), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 137 (Supp. 1952); 41 STAT. 593 (1920), as amcnded, ,.
U.S.C. § 157 (1946); 43 STAT. 162 (1924), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 214 (1940). The
following table indicates the number of aliens deported from the United States for cause
in the years ended June 30, 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952:
Cauze 1952 1951 1950 1949
All causes 20,181 13,544 6,623 20,040
Criminals 778 1,036 790 1,024
Immoral classes 50 07 53 76
Violators of narcotics laws 40 62 55 70
Mental or physical defectives 56 45 53 02
Previously excluded or deported 539 940 553 3,815
Remained longer than authorized 4,469 3289 1,661 1,379
Entered without proper documents 9,636 5,322 1,352 993
Abandoned status of admission 475 293 224 329
Entered without inspection or by
false statements 3,705 2,293 1,734 12,694
Likely to become public charges 24 14 33 20
Subversive or anarchistic 31 18 6 4
Miscellaneous 377 160 109 149
From Ihm. & NAT. Smv. ANx. REP. 36 (1952).
6. In the year ended June 30, 1952, the courts disposed of 319 applications ior writs
of habeas corpus by aliens seeking review of deportation orders. Of this total 14 %wits
were sustained, 221 dismissed, and 84 withdrawn. At the end of the year 52 -writs were
pending. I=. & NAT. SERv. AN.N. REP. table 48 (1952).
7. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
8. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (claim of citizenship). The Nationality Act
of 1940, 54 STAT. 1171, 8 U.S.C. § 903 (1946), made express provision for individuals
within the United States or abroad to bring declaratory judgment actions t, settle the
issue of their citizenship. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (19E0) (eligibility for
citizenship). But see the treatment of the claim of eligibility for citizenship in the
Kristensen case by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 179 F2d 79%
(D.C. Cir. 1949). See Note 12 infra. See also a discussion of the implications of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Kristensen case in Note, 51 Cot. L. RE%. ICA (1951).
The claim of citizenship has always received special treatment. In Ilblma. corpus pro-
ceedings the question of citizenship must be tried de novo to satisfy the requirements of
due process of law%,. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). But, while the burden
of proving alienage is on the Government-United States ex rel. Bilokumky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149 (1923) ; United States ex rd. Bishop v. Watkins, 159 F-2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 839 (1947)-, a person arrested on a warrant of deportation is not pro-
tected by a presumption of citizenship comparable to the presumption of innocence in
criminal cases. United States ex re. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra, at 154 (failure to tahe
stand to assert citizenship held sufficient to support the inference of a lack of citizenaship).
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of a deportation order only by applying for a writ of habeas corpus.0 Section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,10 however, made provision for judi-
cial review of final actions 1 of administrative agencies by "any applicable
9. United States ex tel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) ; Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) ; see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 167 (1945)
(dissent).
10. "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is
by law committed to agency discretion-
"(a) RIGHT OF Rmvnw.-Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any rele-
vant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
"(b) FoRM AND VENUE OF Acrn.-The form of proceeding for judicial review
shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any
court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form
of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or
mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Agency
action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial
enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such
review is provided by law.
"(c) RsaviABLz Acs.-Every agency action made reviewable by statute and
every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court
shall be subject to judicial review. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable shall be subject to review upon the
review of the final agency action ...
"(e) ScoPE OF Rmwnv.-So far as necessary to decision [sic] and where presented
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of
any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or un-
reasonably delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right; (4) without observance or procedure required by law; (5) un-
supported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections
7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute;
or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the courts shall
review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and
due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 60 STAT. 243 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946).
11. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before judicial review
becomes available. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1946). See note 10
supra. For application of this requirement, see United States ex rel. Trinler v.
Carusi, 166 F.2d 457, vacated on other grounds, 168 F2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1948) (peti-
tion for review of a deportation order issued, but not served; held: administrative
process at an end for purposes of "finality"); Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (declaratory and injunctive relief sought before deportation order
issued; held: administrative remedies exhausted for purposes of "finality"); Schol-
nick v. Clark, 81 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1948) (injunctive and declaratory relief
sought during early stage of deportation proceedings; held: relief unavailable be-
cause administrative remedies not exhausted). But cf. Yanish v. Wixon, 81 F. Supp.
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form of legal action," and excepted from its coverage only those agency actions
which Congress had exempted from judicial review, and thoze which were,
by law, committed to agency discretion. Three United States Courts of
Appeals, in applying the Act, granted Section 10 review in deportation cases
where citizen status was not an issue on appeal.12 These decisions denied
that the terms of the Immigration Act of 1917 13-iwhich made the Attorney
General's order "final" in such matters 14 -had placed deportation proceed-
ings within the class of actions excepted from the review available under
Section 10.15 Since judicial review by habeas corpus had regularly been
permitted in deportation cases, the courts reasoned that the immigration
statute failed to evidence any intent to preclude full Section 10 review of ex-
pulsion findings.
In Heikkila v. Barbcr,'G the Supreme Court took issue with the holdings of all
three Courts of Appeals,' 7 and once again confined the review of deportation
499 (N.D. Cal. 194S), rcvd on othcr grounds sub nom. Yanish v. Barber, 181 F2d
492 (9th Cir. 19S0) (administrative remedies need not be exhausted where jurisdiction
of Immigration authorities is challenged). Where declaratory relief is siught to determine
an alien's status, administrative remedies must be exhaustvd. Kridtnsen v. McGrath, 340
U.S. 162, 169 (1950). They must also be exhausted in habeas corpus proe, edings. United
States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 144 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp.
469 (E.D. Va.), dismisscd as moot, 177 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1949).
12. Prince v. Commissioner, 185 F2d 578 (th Cir. 19F0) (petition for review);
United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F.2d 457, vacatcd on ofthcr grou:ds, 163 F2d
1014 (3d Cir. 1948) (petition for review); Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F2d 796 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (declaratory and injunctive relief). The Second Circuit avoided the question
when it appeared as a possible issue in Azzolini v. Watkins, 172 F.2d S97 (2d Cir. 1949).
The court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether Section 10 of the APA applied,
since the petition for review was plainly without merit. See the similar treatmcnt of a
petition for review in Alves v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Contra:
Valenti v. Clark, 83 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1949).
In the Kristesen case, supra, the circuit court held that a declaratory judgment action
under the Administrative Procedure Act was an appropriate method to seek review of
the Attorney General's refusal to suspend deportation on the sole ground that the alien
was ineligible for citizenship. The alien sought declaration by the court of his eligibility.
The Supreme Court, while upholding the right of the alien to seek declaratory relief,
did so on the grounds that "[w]here an official's authority to act depends upon the status
of the person affected, in this case eligibility for citizenship, that status, when in dispute,
may be determined by a declaratory judgment proceeding after the exhaustion of
administrative remedies." Kristensen v. McGrath, 340 U.S. 102, 169 (1950). The Court
found it unnecessary to consider the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act.
13. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1946).
14. "In every case where any person is ordered deported from the United States
under the Provisions of this Act, or of any law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney
General shall be final." Id. § 155 (a).
15. See note 10 supra.
16. 73 Sup. Ct. 603 (1953).
17. The Supreme Court rejected two previous opportunities to pass upon the question
of the applicability of the APA to deportation proceedings. See note 12 supra; and see
also Brief for Petitioner, pp. 23-6, Brief for Respondents, pp. 18-4j, Reply Brief for
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orders, where citizenship status or eligibility for citizenship was not in ques-
tion, to habeas corpus proceedings. Heikkila, relying on Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, had sought review of the validity of a deporta-
tion order against him and had asked for injunctive and declaratory relief.
The Court found that the term "final," as used in the Immigration Act of
1917 to describe the Attorney General's decisions, had acquired a definitive
meaning from immigration statutes enacted in the twenty-five years preced-
ing 1917; and that under the judicial interpretation given "final," the 1917
Act precluded judicial review except so far as required by the Constitution.i
Thus, the majority initially seems to indicate that since Section 10 is applic-
able by its own terms "[e]xcept so far as . . . statutes preclude judicial re-
view," it cannot in deportation cases expand the review previously confined
to habeas corpus.19
The Court would have been logically justified in resting on its conclusion at
this point. By treating the ambiguous "except so far as" clause as merely
perpetuating existing restrictions on the type of review available, the Court
could have reached a reasonable interpretation of the statute. But the majority
went furthfer. It declared that the limited nature of habeas corpus review
was in no sense "judicial review" as that term was used in the APA; there-
fore, the APA did not apply at all to deportation proceedings.20 In a dissent 21
based upon the legislative history of the APA, Justices Frankfurter and Black
seized upon this reasoning. Claiming that the majority had grossly under-
estimated the broadly remedial purposes of the Administrative Procedure
Act, they asserted that the majority had placed too narrow an interpretation
upon "judicial review" as used in that Act; and they concluded that the Act,
in fact, did cover the proceedings of the Immigration authorities. 22 The dis-
senters suggested, however, that even though the forms of Section 10 review
should be available to an alien subject to the 1917 Act, the scope of review
is restricted within the limits previously available under habeas corpus.a
Petitioner, pp. 10-16, Martinez v. Neely, 73 Sup. Ct. 345 (1953). The Court affirmed
without opinion the Seventh Circuit's decision, 197 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1952), which had
expressly avoided the issue.
18. "Read against this background of a quarter of a century of consistent judicial
interpretation, § 19 of the 1917 Immigration Act, 39 Stat. 890 clearly had the effect of
precluding judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was required
by the Constitution." Heikkila v. Barber, 73 Sup Ct. 603, 606 (1953).
19. "Clearer evidence that for present purposes the Immigration Act of 1917 is a
statute precluding judicial review would be hard to imagine. Whatever view be taken
as to the breadth of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the first exception to that
section applies to the case before us. The result is that appellant's rights were riot
enlarged by that Act. Now, as before, he may attack a deportation order only by habeas
corpus." Ibid.
20. Id. at 607.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 607, 608.
23. Id. at 608.
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In limiting the review available in deportation cases to habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, the majority seems to have given reasonable effect to the language
of Section 10. And there is no practical difference between the results that
would accrue from their initial reliance on the "except so far as" clause and
those stemming from their final conclusion that there never was "judicial
review" of such orders. As the minority points out, however, the majority's
basic conclusion is unfortunate on a policy level: it fails to give any effect to
the ackmowledged remedial purposes of the APA. But the dissenters only in
part meet this criticism. They hold that the Attorney General's decisions
under the Immigration Act of 1917 were in fact reviewed by the courts in
the APA sense; that according to the legislative history of the Act the term
"judicial review" was not intended to be given a technical construction. -2 4
Yet, while they reject the final conclusion of the majority and find that de-
portation proceedings fall within the APA, they seem themselves to become
ensnared in the "except so far as" language, since they limit the scope of
review. There is nothing in the language of Section 10 to suggest that the
"except so far as" clause is to have any different application to the form of
review available under 10(b) than to the scope of review provided for in
10(e). 25 If, as the minority implies, Section 10(b) may be invoked in full
upon a finding that judicial review was previously available, then the "except-
ing clause" would seem to mean that the review provisions of the APA vill
be inapplicable only where statutes preclude all judicial review. Since in their
view this is not so in the case of deportation proceedings, full application of
the APA would be required. Although such a position is at least arguable,
the minority's ultimate refusal to permit review of scope beyond that available
in habeas corpus contradicts its own logic and makes any attempt at con-
clusive analysis of the minority opinion impossible.20
The effect of the Heikkila decision, under either the majority or minority
view, is to create two distinct and anomalous classes of alien deportees. The
24. The very fact of its inclusion in Section 10 of the APA, see note 10 supra,
seems to indicate that Congress considered habeas corpus "judicial review." In no part
of the legislative history of the APA is a distinction made between habeas corpus review
and other forms of review. See SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3f6-7, 212, 276,
325-6, 369 (1946).
25. See, however, note 26 infra. The majority in Hedkkila, while refusing to pass 4n
the question, 73 Sup. Ct. 603, 607 n.12 (1953), appears to have felt that if Section 10
were applicable at all, the full scope of its review vould be accorded despite previous
habeas corpus restrictions. Id. at 606, 607.
26. It might be possible to argue that the "except so far as" clause works a different
effect on § 10(b) than on § 10(e) because of the provision in 10(b) that the form of
review shall be any "special statutory review . . . or, in the absence or inadcquacy
thereof, any applicable form of legal action." (Emphasis supplied.) See note 10 supra. The
dissenters in Heikkila note the inconvenience of the habeas corpus requirement that the
alien be in custody before he can challenge a deportation order. 73 Sup. Ct. 603, c05,-9
(1953). This "inconvenience" could be interpreted as an "inadequacy" of habeas corpus
review as that term is used in § 10(b). Though habeas corpus is not a "special statutory
review," the Court has read constitutional requirements into the immigration statute for
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1917 law has been replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,P'
And in new deportation actions instituted under that statute, the full scope
of review available under Section 10 will undoubtedly obtain "8 The Supreme
Court declared in Heikkila that it would study the legislative history of every
congressional statute -to determine whether judicial review under the Admini-
strative Procedure Act was intended.29 And the history of the 1952 Act
clearly shows that intent: both Senator McCarran and Representative Walter,
sponsors of -the bill, announced in congressional debates that Section 10 of the
APA would apply to deportation proceedings under the new Act, and that the
Attorney General's orders would possess "finality" only in the administrative
sense.30 But the provisions of the new Act do not apply to actions commenced
the purposes of the APA before. See note 43 infra. Thus, it is possible to argue that
while the "except so far as" clause works its limitation on all subsections of § 10, it is
itself subject to the language of 10(b) and therefore that the alien is not limited to
habeas corpus review because that form of "statutory" review is "inadequate."
27. 66 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
28. See discussion in text at notes 42-47 infra.
29. 73 Sup. Ct. 603, 605 (1953).
30. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1101 el seq. (Supp. 1953), provides, as did its predecessor, the Act of 1917: "In any
case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United States under the provisions
of this chapter or of any other law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall
be final." 66 STAT. 208, (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b) (Supp. 1953). This provision
caused concern among some members of Congress who feared that judicial review of
deportation orders was thereby precluded. See statements of Senator Benton, 98 CoNa.
REc. 5113 (1952); Senator Welker, id. at 5421; Representative I-Idler, id. at 4311.
Senator Lehman proposed an amendment which would have expressly made the provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to "all proceedings relating to the ex-
clusion or expulsion of aliens." Id. at 5427-8. And Senator Morse offered an amend-
ment which would make a declaratory judgment action available to review deportation or
exclusion proceedings. Id. at 5781. But both of these amendments were defeated, In the
House, Representative Meader offered an amendment which would have subjected de-
portation orders to "review by any court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 4414-16. That,
too, met defeat. However, these amendments were defeated on the ground that judicial
review already existed for deportation proceedings and because of a reluctance to ex-
pand review of exclusion proceedings. In response to the Meader amendment, Repre-
sentative Walter explained what was meant by the "finality" provision of the new Act.
"Now we come to this question of the finality of the decision of the Attorney General.
That language means that it is a final decision as far as the administrative branch of
the government is concerned, but it is not final in that it is not the last remedy the alien
has. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act [sic] is applicable. From that
decision an appeal lies in the courts. If there is not a final administrative decision, then
these aliens will go from one administrative body to another, seeking relief, because they
do not want a final ajudication....
"In view of the fact that every person who is ordered deported has all of these
administrative processes available, plus an appeal to the court, plus a right to a writ of
habeas corpus, I cannot conceive of a case where any injustice would be done by some
capricious or arbitrary administrator.
"I would like to remind the gentleman of one thing, that Senator McCARRAN, who sat
in these hearings, and in the preparation of this bill, and I, were both commended by
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prior to its passage.31 Since many deportation proceedings under the 1917
Act are still pending and many such deportation orders are outstanding,3
aliens proceeding according to the old Act will ply a different road in search
of relief than their counterparts under the present statute.33
Significant differences exist between the scope and form of review available
under habeas corpus proceedings and the scope and form available under
the unrestricted application of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. Deportation orders would be subject to a broader review under the
APA than is now required in habeas corpus actions. The writ of habeas
corpus traditionally issues only where the alien can prove he has been denied
the American Bar Association because of the work we did in providing for judicial
review from a decision of an administrative agency. We have been very zealous to zee
that the philosophy underlying that act is embodied in this measure." Id. at 4416.
Senator McCarran echoed this explanation. "WNhy is it, Mr. President, that the op-
ponents of this measure repeatedly assert that my bill violates the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act in deportation proceedings when a perusal of the bill would
convince any fair-minded man that the bill is 100 percent within the framework of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which, incidentally, I sponsored and authored in the Senate.
"Mr. President, no Senator is more jealous of the provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act than is the senior Senator from Nevada; and I say to the Senate that the
omnibus immigration bill, S.2550, is completely within the framework of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act." Id. at 5329. See also, explanatory statements by Representative
Walter, id. at 4302, 4429, and the statement of the House managers, appended to the
Conference Report on the Act. H.R. REP. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1952).
It is also indicative of congressional intent to provide judicial review that § 242(c) of
the Act, 66 STAT. 203 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(c) (Supp. 1953), specifically recognizes
such review.
31. 66 STAT. 280 (1952), Pub. L No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 405 (June 27, 1952).
32. On June 30, 1952, 8,505 unexecuted orders of deportation -were outstanding.
3,183 of these had been outstanding 6 months or less, while 5,322 had been outstanding
over six months, some for years. I,=t. & NAT. SEnv. AN-N. Rm. 37 (1952). On October
1, 1952 there were 4,959 unexecuted orders of deportation which had been outstanding in
excess of six months. HEI.6X'as FORE THE PRsIrENT's Co.I. I'lm. & X,%T. 19&4 (1952).
It is possible that many years after the passage of the 1952 Act, the courts will still
be dealing with deportation orders issued under the Act of 1917. See United States
cx rel. Adamantides v. Neelly, 191 F2d 997 (7th Cir. 1951) (15 years from service of
warrant of deportation to court review of deportation order); Prince v. C-mmissioner,
185 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1950) (9 years from service of warrant of deportatiun to court
review of deportation order); Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(8 years from service of warrant of deportation to court review of proceedings);
Vergas v. Shaughnessy, 97 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (11 years from service if
warrant of deportation to court review of deportation order).
33. Confronted with convincing evidence of legislative purpose and in view of the
express interpretation of "finality" as "administrative finality," the courts can b- e.p2cted
to grant full APA review to post-1952 deportees, while limiting pre-1952 aliens to the
Heikkila-restricted remedy of habeas corpus. Since the 1952 Act's provision that the
Attorney General's actions shall be "final" is not an attempt to limit judicial review, § 10
of the APA, applicable except so far as statutes preclude judicial review, applies in full
to the Act.
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due process of law. 34 Such a showing can be made by his demonstrating that
the Immigration authorities acted outside of the scope of their statutory
authority,35 or that the procedure adopted to arrive at a decision was unfair,11
or that there was a lack of evidence to support the decision. 7 But in all cases
the inquiry is limited to the constitutionality of agency action.8 To comply
with the requirements of due process, there must at least be sufficient evidence
to show that the action of the Attorney General was not arbitrary or unreason-
able.39 In recent years some courts have expanded their inquiry in habeas
corpus proceedings and have required a showing of "substantial" evidence
to support deportation orders.40 The verbal formula still accepted by the
Supreme Court, however, permits the decisions of Immigration authorities
34. Heikkila v. Barbar, 73 Sup. Ct. 603, 606 (1953) ; see also the dissent of Douglas, J.,
on other grounds, in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 185 (1948).
35. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (order of deportation based on
reasons not specified by Congress void); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915); Gonzales
v. Williams 192 U.S. 1, 15 (1903).
36. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950);
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1907); Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamnataya
v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903). As an aspect of a fair hearing, due notice to the alieu
of the charge against him is required. United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131
(1924).
37. See, e.g., Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) ; Scholnick v. Clark, 81 F.
Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1948).
38. See Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D. Va.), dinnissed as fnoot,
177 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1949): "In every such instance [habeas corpus review] the writ
has gone no further than to ascertain whether a person in custody is held under authority
of law ... and to determine whether or not the deportation order was reached through
procedures affording due process of law. It is a review of the constitutionality of the
custody and expulsion."
In Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939), the Supreme Court states the traditional
formula for review: "If the hearing was fair, if there was evidence to support the finding
of the Secretary, and if no error of law was committed, the ruling of the Department
must stand and cannot be corrected in judicial proceedings." Id. at 34. The courts need
inquire into these standards only to see that a constitutional minimum of protection is
maintained. See also United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924). Thus there
is no showing of a lack of due process merely by establishing that the decision of the
agency is wrong or that incompetent evidence was received and considered. United States
ex rel Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927). But for an indication of
how far courts will sometimes go into the facts, see U.S. ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zin-
merman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (lack of fair hearing where unbefriended alien,
unable to speak English and without funds, was merely given the opportunity to use
telephone to obtain an attorney) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (Court appears
to substitute its own judgment for that of the immigration authorities). See also Note,
49 COL. L. REV. 73, 85-7 (1949).
39. United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-4 (1924).
40. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Adamantides v. Neelly, 191 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th
Cir. 1951) ; United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir.
1950); Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1949), cert dcnid, 339 U.S.




to be upheld where "some" or "any" evidence or simply "evidence" supports
their conclusion.41 Even where "substantial evidence" standards are applied
in habeas corpus review, the Supreme Court's decision in Unizrsal Camera
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board 4 2 indicates that the APA require-
ment of "substantial evidence . . . on . . . the whole record"4 a3 imposes a
wider scope of review than the traditional "substantial evidence" test applied
in habeas corpus proceedings. Under an unrestricted application of APA,
the courts are instructed to weigh evidence supporting the Government's
action against evidence offered by the alien.4 4 Under habeas corpus pro-
41. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34 (1939) (evidence); United States cx rcL
Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) (some evidence and any evidence
used interchangeably) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149 (1945) (some evidence);
see Ludecke v. Watldns, 335 U.S. 160, 185, K7 (1949) (dissent upon other grun oi
Douglas, J., iterating a some evidence test). Dissenting in the Bridges case, sufra, Chiei
Justice Stone states that the courts had alw-ays been satisfied if evidence of "any proba-
tive value" was available to support the decision of administrative agencies. 32-1 U.S. at
167. His opinion indicates the amount of evidence that the Court required as a minimum
to satisfy constitutionality before the Bridges case. "With increasing frequency this c,.urt
is called upon to apply the rule, which it has followed for many years, in deportation
cases as well as in other reviews of administrative proceedings, that when there is evidence
more than a scintilla, and not unbelieveable on its face, it is for the administrative
officer to determine its credibility and weight. . . . We cannot rightly reject the ad-
ministrative findings here and accept, as we do almost each week, particularly in our
denials of certiorari, the findings of administrative agencies which rest on the tenuous
support of evidence far less persuasive than the present record presents." Id. at 178.
42. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
43. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1946). While there are limitations
placed upon the applicability of the "substantial evidence" requirement in § 10(e) (5),
these limitations would not seem to pertain to deportation proceedings under the immigra-
tion acts. The Act of 1917 is not subject to the requirements of §§ 7 and S of the APA,
see note 52 infra, nor is there an express statutory requirement of a hearing .ith a de-
termination of deportability on the record. See note 4 supra. But the Supreme Court
has held that a hearing with a determination on the record is demanded by the Constitu-
tion, and the Court reads this constitutional requirement into the statute. The Court
finds that the APA's requirement of a "statutory" provision for a hearing is satiified
by the "more than statutory" requirement imposed by the Constitution. Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modificd, 339 U.S. 903 (1950). The Act of 1952 Makes specific
statutory provision for determination of deportability on the record made at a hearing.
66 STAT. 20S (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b) (Supp. 1953).
44. "The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record
fairly detracts from its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement ...
that the courts consider the whole record. Committee reports and the adoption in the
Administrative Procedure Act of the minority views of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee demonstrate that to enjoin such a duty on the reviewing court w:as one of the
important purposes of the movement which eventuated in that enactment." Univcrsal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 4 3 (1951). The
Court concedes that Congress by the use of these terms has expressed a "mood" and not
a "body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application." Id. at 4,7. But because the
change is so "elusive," the court warns, it cannot be ignored. Id. at 490. And even though
"some-perhaps a majority--" of the courts have always applied the rule, its enforce-
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cedure, courts are required to find only that the Government's evidence
standing alone is sufficient to support the deportation order, without neces-
sarily considering the opposing evidence offered by the alien. 4" Courts
reviewing deportation orders under the APA as applied to the 1952 Act
thus incur a "wider responsibility for reasonableness and fairness" 40 than
is otherwise imposed. The limitations that many courts recognize on their
scope of review in habeas corpus proceedings is eliminated. 47
ment will still affect some courts. While the subject before the Court in the Universal
Cavwra case was the rule of evidence applicable to NLRB findings, the Court carefully
notes it is making a decision of universal application in defining the meaning of "sub-
stantial evidence . . .on . . .the whole record." Id. at 487.
45. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122, 123 (1946) this minimal require-
ment was recognized. "The provisions making the decisions of the local [draft] boards
'final' means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this act
the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means
that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made
by the local boards was justified." In a footnote the Court then pointed out: "That is
the scope of judicial inquiry in deportation cases where Congress has made the orders
of deportation final."Id. at 123 n.14.
Authorities differ, however, on whether, or to what extent, reviewing courts have
actually ignored opposing evidence in reaching a conclusion on the validity of administra-
tive decisions. See DAvis, ADmimSTRATiVE LAw 916, 917 (1951) and authorities cited
therein.
46. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 490
(1951).
47. While the change in the scope of review imposed by the APA may merely reflect what
is the actual practice of some courts, and is perhaps an elusive one, see notes 44 and 45
supra, it will act to ensure expansion of the review all courts afford deportation orders,
See United States ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (the
court recognizes a limitation in pre-APA habeas corpus review and compares it with
the wider scope of review that is available to it under the APA); Yiakouns v, Hall,
83 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Va.), dismissed as moot, 177 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1949) (applicability
of APA denied on ground that habeas corpus did not provide the broad review con-
templated by APA). The Heikkila court also recognized the more limited form of
review in habeas corpus proceedings. Heikkila v. Barber, 73 Sup. Ct. 603, 606 (1953).
And see the personal revelations made by Judge Simon Rifkind concerning the limita-
tions on his authority to review Immigration officials' decisions in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings in Joint Hearings before the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 716, H.R. 2379,
and H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 575-6 (1951). Judge Rifkind referred particularly
to an exclusion case, Ex parte Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nm.
United States ex rel. Johnson v. Watkins, 170 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1948), rev'd and remnanded
sub nom. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949); but his
observations apply to deportation proceedings as well. The bills before Congress at the
time of Judge Rifldnd's testimony were the predecessors to the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952. S. 716 and H.R. 2379 provided that administrative decisions could be
reviewed only in habeas corpus proceedings on questions of law. The hearings contain
an indictment of habeas corpus for the narrow scope of review it affords and the incon-
venience it creates, and the witnesses before the Committees urge the application of § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Joint Hearings, supra, at 136 et seq., 345 et
seq., 527 et seq., 575 et seq. Contra: id. at 711, 712.
EVAl 621010
NOTES
A further disadvantage to the alien restricted to habeas corpus review
under the majority opinion in Hclkkila arises from the fact that the writ
can be sought only when the alien has been taken into custody after service
of the order of deportation.4S Under the APA, in contrast, judicial review
of all pertinent issues is immediately available.49
The grave nature of deportation proceedings should prompt every con-
sideration for the interests of alien deportees.) ° The authority of Immigra-
tion officials is unlimited: they are charged with the duty of conducting
investigations, holding hearings, prosecuting, and passing judgment.!; This
commingling of judicial and enforcement functions in the came individuals
has been deemed dangerous and open to abuse,02 particularly in view of the
48. Yanish v. Phelan, 86 F. Supp. 461, 462 (N.D. Cal. 1949); United States ex rel.
Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F.2d 457, 461, vacated on other grounds, 10S F2d 1014 (3d Cir.
1948). See, however, Slavick v. Miller, S9 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 184 F24 575
(3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951) (detainer lodged for delivery oi alien
to Immigration authorities at the end of his prison sentence; held: technical custody
sufficient to authorize application for writ of habeas corpus to challenge deportation
order).
49. Custody is not a prerequisite to review in other than habeas corpus proceedings.
The only prerequisite to judicial review of agency actions in the forms of review made
available by the APA is the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See note 11 mstra;
Slavik v. Miller, supra note 48.
A jurisdictional problem arises, however, where review is sought under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Habeas corpus proceedings can only be brought in the district in
which the alien is detained, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 18 (1943), and the Director of
Immigration and Naturalization for that district is the sole indispenable party. Medalha
v. Shaughnessy, 102 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). But where review is sought under
the APA there is a division of opinion over whether the Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization is an indispensable party. Some courts have held that he is. Sce
Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Podovinnikoff v. Miller, 179 F2d 937
(3d Cir. 1950); Medalha v. Shaughnessy, suPra; Birns v. Conmmissioner, 103 F. Supp.
ISO (N.D. Ohio 1952). Others have held the other way. See Navarro v. Landon, 10
F. Supp. 73 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Yanish v. Phelan, 86 F. Supp. 4u1 (N.D. Cal. 1949);
Yanish v. Wixon, 81 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Cal. 1948), rezd on other grounds sub :o; .
Yanish v. Barber, 181 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1950). For a discussion of this question, see
Recent Developments in the Lau-Imnigratio and Nationality, 6-6 HA-V. L REV. 643,
702-3 (1953).
50. While deportation is a civil proceeding-Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585,
591 (1913) ; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923), Mahler v. Eby, 2A U.S. 32,
39 (1924)-, the courts have recognized the gravity of the penalty it imposes. See Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 234 (1922) (deportation is a proceeding capable of destroying
"all that makes life worth living") ; see also Bridges v. Wixon, 320 U.S. 135, 147 (1945).
51. See note 4 supra. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has expressed
dissatisfaction even with habeas corpus review, since it offers a means of delaying deporta-
tion. Ibn. & NAT. SEnv. AN.N. REP. 10 (1952).
52. See the discussion in REP. Pswmmzr's Comm. Inhu. & NAT. 154-o7 (1953)
and the references cited therein. See also the opinion of the Supreme Court in Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 903 (1950). The Court there
held that the procedural requirements of the APA, 60 STA-T. 241, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1u04, 160,
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personal freedom aspects of deportation cases. 5 3 And the ability of deporta-
tion officers to be objective and unerring in their judgment has been ques-
tioned. 54 Thus the need for close judicial review of deportation orders is
evident. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to compel deportees to terminate
their affairs and submit to detention before it is finally determined that de-
portation is properr 5 Against these arguments for APA review, the Justice
Department half-heartedly asserted in the Heikkila case that such review
might permit possibly repetitious litigation by granting a choice of remedies
---declaratory judgment, injunction, and so on-to the deportee. The Gov-
ernment also argued that the deportee, under the Administrative Procedure7
Act, may be permitted to substitute venue in the District of Columbia for
the district in which he is detained.50 These considerations, however, assume
petty stature against the burdens and limitations of habeas corpus review.
And for aliens whose rights and status are determined under the 1952 Act,
Congress has clearly provided such opportunities.
While lower courts can avoid Heikkila to some extent by continuing to
expand the scope of habeas corpus, equal treatment of all aliens seems a
desirable legislative objective. Congress should therefore reconsider the
plight of aliens excluded by Heikkila from the benefits of APA review, and
1007 (1946), were applicable to deportation proceedings. Thus, for a short time APA's
remedial provisions obtained for such proceedings. But Congress was soon prevailed
upon expressly to except deportation proceedings from the procedural requirements of
the Act. 64 STAT. 1048 (1950), 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (Supp. 1952). See discussion of the
arguments advanced for the exception by the Department of Justice in 98 Coma. Rre,
5625-6 (1952). Senator McCarran concedes that the arguments were fallacious. Ibid,
See also the discussion of past attempts to take deportation proceedings out front uinder
the APA. Ibid.
53. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 125 (1946) (concurrence of Justice Murphy
suggesting that to accord finality to administrative decisions where personal liberties are
involved is unconstitutional).
54. An arresting view is taken by Mr. Arthur Garfield Hays who writes: "[T]he
judgment of the men in the [Immigration] Department is likely to be influenced by the
fact that a decision favorable to the alien as a security risk might some day be subject to
question or criticism, where nobody is subject to criticism if he is hard, cruel, casual, or
uses bad judgment-that is if the individual is poor, unknown and helpless. The officer
involved is patriotic-he takes no risk. Government officers are likely to become callous
in the course of time. The Immigration Department has long been cruel and unfair."
Hays, Introduction in KNAuFr, THE ELLEN KNAur- STORY xii (1952). See United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (dissent by Justice Jackson).
See also REP. PREDsEmNT's Comm. Imm. & NAT. 162-3 (1953).
55. Though the harshness of continued custody is "normally" mitigated by the grant-
ing of bail, it is still an inconvenience to the alien that he cannot challenge the deporta-
tion order until he is taken into nominal custody. See statement of Robert L. Stern,
Acting Solicitor General, speaking for himself and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, HEAm Gs BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S Comm. Imi. & NAT. 1353 (1952).
56. Heikkila v. Barber, 73 Sup. Ct. 603, 607 (1935). See also Brief for Respondent,
pp. 44-46, Martinez v. Neelly, 73 Sup. Ct. 345 (1953).
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make Section 10 fully applicable to actions now pending under the 1917
Immigration Law.
More broadly, the whole question of deportation review might profitably
be e-mined and remedial legislation enacted which strikes a balance between
the alien's right to fair, efficient remedies and the Government's desire to
obviate dilatory tactics. The President's Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization has suggested such legislation."T Its proposal would estab-
lish one definite proceeding for review, to be available within sixt, days after
the deportation order is issued, and to be brought in the district court of
the district in which the alien is a resident. Such review would be granted
priority on court calendars and the remedy sought would be made exclusive
to prevent multitudinous attacks. The scope of the review would be governed
by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. An amendment of this
sort is highly desirable. And to avoid decisions like Hcikkila, the new procedure
should be made retroactive to cover those aliens now disadvantaged by the
obsolete restrictions which historical development has made a part of the
Immigration Act of 1917.
57. RE. PRasmmcr's Comm. -rm. & NAT. 169-70 (1953).
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